Abstract-We consider a set of cellular users associated with a base station (BS) in a cellular network that employs Device-todevice (D2D) communication. A subset of the users request for some files from the BS. Now, some of the users can potentially act as relays and forward the requested files, or partitions of files, from the BS to the requesting users (destination nodes) over D2D links. However, this requires cooperation among the cellular users. Also, when cellular users cooperate with each other, the total amount of energy consumed in transferring the requested files from the BS to the destination nodes can usually be considerably reduced compared to the case when each user separately downloads the file it needs from the BS. In this paper, we seek conditions under which users have an incentive to cooperate with each other. To this end, we model the above scenario using the framework of cooperative game theory. We are particularly interested in conditions under which it is beneficial for all the cellular users to cooperate, i.e., the grand coalition is stable. For this we use the solution concept of core from cooperative game theory. We consider two different models: (i) Model A, in which the BS can split a file into multiple partitions and send these partitions to different relays, which multicast the partitions to the destination nodes, and (ii) Model B, in which for each file, the BS sends the entire file to a single relay, which multicasts it to the destination nodes. First, we show that, in general, the above coalitional game under Model A may have an empty core, i.e., it may not be possible to stabilize the grand coalition. However, we show that in an important special case of this game, wherein all D2D and BS-cellular user communication links are symmetric across cellular users and the D2D data rates are much higher than the BS-cellular user data rates, the core is always non-empty. Next, we show that under Model B, the problem of assigning relays to destination nodes so as to maximize the sum of utilities of all the users is NP-Complete. Finally, we design heuristics to solve this problem and evaluate their performance via numerical computations.
over D2D links. Also, often multiple users request the same file (e.g., a popular file); in this case, a relay can multicast the file, or a partition of the file, to all the users requesting it over D2D links. When such relaying is employed, the total amount of energy consumed in transferring the requested files from the BS to the requesting users (destination nodes) can usually be considerably reduced compared to the case when each user separately downloads the file it needs from the BS [3] , [4] . Such offloading of data by the BS to D2D links can also improve the capacity of the cellular network [3] , [4] .
In this paper, we consider a set of cellular users associated with a BS in a cellular network that employs D2D communication. A subset of the users request for some files from the BS. As mentioned above, some of the users can potentially act as relays and forward the requested files, or partitions of files, from the BS to the destination nodes over D2D links, which results in greater energy efficiency. However, this requires cooperation among the cellular users. We seek conditions under which users have an incentive to cooperate with each other. To this end, we model the above scenario using the framework of cooperative game theory [14] (see Section II-B). We are particularly interested in conditions under which it is beneficial for all the cellular users to cooperate, i.e., the grand coalition is stable. For this we use the solution concept of core [14] from cooperative game theory. Intuitively, the grand coalition can be stabilized iff the core is non-empty [14] . We consider two different models (see Section II-A): (i) Model A, in which the BS can split a file into multiple partitions and send these partitions to different relays, which multicast the partitions to the destination nodes, and (ii) Model B, in which for each file, the BS sends the entire file to a single relay, which multicasts it to the destination nodes. First, we show that, in general, the above coalitional game under Model A may have an empty core, i.e., it may not be possible to stabilize the grand coalition (see Section III-A). Next, we consider an important special case of this game, wherein all D2D and BS-cellular user communication links are symmetric across cellular users and the D2D data rates are much higher than the BS-cellular user data rates-such a scenario would occur in practice when all the cellular users are located close to each other, e.g., in a stadium or concert hall, and hence data exchange between a pair of users can occur at a fixed and high rate, but the users are situated far away from the BS. In this special case, we show that the core is always non-empty (see Section III-B). Also, we show that under Model B, the problem of assigning relays to destination nodes so as to maximize the sum of utilities of all the users is NP-Complete (see Section IV-A). Hence, we do not perform a cooperative game theoretic analysis of Model B. Instead, we provide heuristics to solve the utility maximization problem in this model (see Section IV-B) and evaluate their performance via numerical computations (see Section V).
We now review related prior literature. Resource allocation problems with the objective of achieving energy efficiency in cooperative networks are studied in [2] , [8] , [9] , [16] , [18] . In [16] , a cooperative cellular network wherein the BS sends content to some selected cellular users, which in turn broadcast it to other cellular users is considered. The problem of joint optimization of the cost of both the energy consumption and cellular-link usage in the network by appropriately selecting the transmission rates of the relays is studied. In [8] , [9] , cellular data offloading in a cooperative cellular network framework, in which data transmission to the end users and energy harvesting are simultaneously performed, is studied. Algorithms to optimally schedule the data offloading and radio resources in order to maximize the energy efficiency of the network are presented. In [18] , the content distribution problem in a cooperative network, wherein the BS selects relays to broadcast some common content, is modeled as a nontransferable utility coalition formation game, in which the utility function takes into account energy efficiency and mutual interference among multiple relays. A distributed algorithm is presented using which cellular users can self-organize among themselves to form a coalition. A coalition formation game is also studied in [2] , in which cellular users can cooperate and self-organize to form coalitions among themselves and use them to distribute content. In each coalition, a cellular user acts as the head of the coalition; it receives data from the BS and then multicasts the data to the users in the coalition. A distributed algorithm for coalition formation is proposed and the energy efficiency when coalitions are formed using this algorithm is shown to be higher than that in a non-cooperative cellular network and in a cellular network where all the cellular users requesting the content form a grand coalition. Our work differs from [2] in that our Model A allows a file to be split into multiple partitions, with different partitions being multicast by different relays to the destination nodes. Also, none of the above papers [2] , [8] , [9] , [16] , [18] study conditions under which the grand coalition is stable. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to use a coalitional game framework to study conditions under which the grand coalition is stable in the context of content distribution in a cellular network employing D2D communication. Our analysis provides insight into conditions under which it is, and is not, beneficial for all the cellular users to cooperate.
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. Network Model
We consider a single cell containing a base station (BS) and multiple cellular users. Let N = {1, . . . , N } denote the set of all cellular users. In a given time slot, some of them request for some files from the BS-we refer to such cellular users as "destination nodes". We assume that each destination node requests for exactly one file. Let M = {1, . . . , M } denote the set of all requested files. The BS seeks to reduce the energy consumption by employing some of the cellular users from the set N as relays to forward the requested files to the destination nodes over D2D links, instead of directly sending the requested file to each destination node (A destination node of a file may also act as a relay for the same and/or other files). If a file (e.g., a popular file) is requested by more than one destination node, then a relay multicasts the file, or a partition of the file, to all the destination nodes that requested the file. Specifically, we consider two different models: (A) the BS can split a file into multiple partitions and send these partitions to different relays, which multicast the partitions to the destination nodes, (B) for each file, the BS sends the entire file to a single relay, which multicasts it to the destination nodes. In the sequel, we refer to the above models as Model A and Model B; these are studied in Sections III and IV respectively. Let α i,j , i ∈ M, j ∈ N denote the fraction of file i that is sent by the BS to relay j. In Model A (respectively, Model B), these variables must satisfy α i,j ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ M, j ∈ N (respectively, α i,j ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ M, j ∈ N ). Also, in both models, N j=1 α i,j = 1 ∀i ∈ M must be satisfied. We assume that the BS knows the channel conditions between itself and different cellular users and among different cellular users through Channel State Information (CSI) conveyed by the cellular users. This information can be estimated using reference signals, which are sent at known transmit powers and whose received powers are measured at the receivers [10] . Using the channel conditions, the data rates that can be achieved between different pairs of devices can be found. Let R s,j denote the achievable data rate between the BS and cellular user j and let P Rx,j (R s,j ) denote the power used by relay j to receive a file from the BS. We formulate the energy spent by users in the cellular network using a model similar to that in [2] . The total energy spent by relay j in receiving (partitions of) files from the BS is given by:
where X i denotes the size of file i ∈ M. Equation (1) holds because α i,j X i is the number of bits of file i downloaded by relay j from the BS, αi,j Xi Rs,j is the amount of time spent and αi,j Xi Rs,j P Rx,j (R s,j ) is the energy consumed during the download of bits of file i to relay j from the BS. Let R i T x,j denote the data rate at which relay j multicasts (a partition of) file i to the destination nodes that request file i and let P i T x,j (R i T x,j ) be the transmission power it uses. Similar to (1), the total energy spent by relay j in multicasting (partitions of) files in M to the destination nodes is given by:
where
Now, for every user j ∈ N which acts as a relay, energy is consumed in receiving data from the BS and multicasting it to destination nodes. However, since only a limited amount of battery energy is available with a relay, we let E j denote the maximum amount of energy that may be spent by user j on relaying activities in the given time slot. Each relay j ∈ N must satisfy the following constraint:
Let R j,l be the achievable data rate between users j and l. Recall that a relay multicasts a file, or a partition of a file, to all the destination nodes that request the file. In particular, let N i denote the set of destination nodes which request file i. A relay j which multicasts a fraction α i,j of file i multicasts it at data rate R i T x,j = min{R j,l : l ∈ N i }, i.e., at the minimum of the data rates from relay j to each of the destination nodes that request file i.
Also, each destination node which requests a file must spend some energy on receiving partitions of the file from different relays. If destination node l requests file m, then the energy it spends in receiving (partitions of) file m is given by:
is the power consumed at user l while receiving data from user j at rate R m T x,j .
B. Coalitional Game Model
Note that for the network model described in Section II-A, the total amount of energy required to transfer files from the BS to all the requesting destination nodes can usually be considerably reduced when cellular users cooperate with each other, transfer files by relaying as explained in Section II-A and transfer payments among themselves (e.g., payments may be transferred from a destination node to the relays that forward data to it), as compared to the case when each destination node separately downloads the file it needs from the BS. Hence, we are interested in finding conditions under which it is beneficial for the cellular users of the network to cooperate with each other. For this purpose, we use the framework of cooperative game theory [14] .
First we define some terminology and notations. Definition 1: A coalition S ⊆ N is a set of users who cooperate among themselves. We refer to N as the grand coalition [14] .
Definition 2: A coalitional game with transferable payoffs (N , v) consists of a set, N , of N users and a real-valued function v(·) associated with each coalition S ⊆ N . v(S) is called the value of the coalition S [14] .
A subset of cellular users S ⊆ N can form a coalition in which relays which are part of S receive, from the BS, only (partitions of) those files which are requested by the destination nodes in S and only multicast them to the destination nodes in S. Suppose file i ∈ M is requested by one or more destination nodes in S; then the following constraint must be satisfied: j∈S α i,j = 1. This constraint says that if a file i is requested by destination node(s) in S, then the relays in S together multicast the entire requested file to them.
Let N S i denote the set of destination nodes in S which request file i. A relay j which multicasts a fraction α i,j of file i multicasts it at data rate R i T x,j = min{R j,l : l ∈ N S i }, i.e., at the minimum of the data rates from relay j to each of the destination nodes in S that request file i.
Let C j r (S) (respectively, C j t (S)) denote the monetary cost corresponding to the energy consumed at relay j, when it is in coalition S, due to the energy expenditure E j r (S) (respectively, E j t (S)) incurred by relay j while downloading partitions of files from the BS (respectively, multicasting partitions of files to destination nodes). Similarly, let C j m (S) be the monetary cost corresponding to the energy, E j m , spent by destination node j in receiving file m that it requested from relays when it is a part of coalition S. We assume that these monetary costs are linear functions of the energy consumed:
, where a is a constant. Note that E j r (S), E j t (S) and E j m (S) are as in (1), (2) and (4) respectively with N replaced by S.
If destination node j requests file i, we let U i j denote the utility that destination node j derives from file i. Let the indicator d i,j be defined as follows:
1 if file i is requested by destination node j, 0 otherwise.
Note that d i,j , i ∈ M, j ∈ S, are constants that are known a priori. The overall utility of user j is defined to be the difference between the utility that it derives from the file that it requests and the costs due to the energy consumption during
. Hence, when a group of cellular users form a coalition S, the following optimization problem maximizes their sum of utilities:
Constraint 1) says that the variables α i,j must be nonnegative, constraint 2) says that if a user in coalition S requests file i, then the entire file must be downloaded from the BS by the relays in coalition S and constraint 3) says that the amount of energy consumed by each user j ∈ S due to its relaying services must not exceed E j . In addition, in Model A (respectively, Model B), the constraint α i,j ≤ 1 (respectively, α i,j ∈ {0, 1}) must be met for all i ∈ M and j ∈ S. We define the optimal value of the objective function in (5) to be the value, v(S), of the coalition S. Now, we are particularly interested in conditions under which it is beneficial for all the cellular users in N to cooperate, i.e., the grand coalition (see Definition 1) is stable. For this we use the solution concept of core from cooperative game theory [14] .
Definition 3: Let (N , v) be a coalitional game with transferable payoffs. A vector (x j ) j∈N is said to be a feasible
The core is the set of all feasible payoff profiles (x j ) j∈N for which x(S) = j∈S x j ≥ v(S) for every coalition S ⊆ N [14] . Now, the grand coalition can be stabilized iff the core is non-empty [14] . This can be explained as follows. Recall that the maximum total utility (value), v(N ), of the grand coalition is given by the optimal value of the objective function in (5) with S = N . Suppose the core is non-empty and this total utility v(N ) is shared among the users in N as per an element x in the core, i.e., payments are transferred among the users in N such that the utility of user j ∈ N becomes x j . Note that this can be done since
Then no subset of users S ⊆ N has an incentive to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the grand coalition is stable. To prove this, suppose a subset of users S ⊆ N formed a separate coalition and shared their total utility, v(S), as per the vector y. However, it would be in the interest of user j ∈ S to split from the grand coalition only if y j > x j . Hence, v(S) = j∈S y j > j∈S x j = x(S), which contradicts the fact that x is an element of the core. Conversely, it is easy to see that if the core is empty, then there would always be an incentive for some subset S ⊆ N to split from the grand coalition, regardless of how the total utility (value) v(N ) is shared among the users of N ; i.e., the grand coalition cannot be stabilized. ] . As explained at the end of Section II-B, the grand coalition can be stabilized iff the core is non-empty. Hence, in this section, we seek conditions under which the core is non-empty. First, in Section III-A, we show that, in general, the above coalitional game under Model A may have an empty core. Next, in Section III-B, we show that in an important special case of this game, the core is always non-empty.
III. COOPERATIVE GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS
OF MODEL A In this section, we analyze Model A, in which the variables α i,j , i ∈ M, j ∈ N may take real values in [0, 1
A. General Game
Consider the above coalitional game under Model A. First, note that since the variables α i,j , i ∈ M, j ∈ N may take real values, the optimization problem P (S) defined in Section II-B (see (5) ) is a linear program and hence can be optimally solved in polynomial time [11] . Hence, the value, v(S), of each coalition S, which is the optimal value of the objective function in (5), can be found in polynomial time.
The following example shows that this coalitional game may have an empty core.
Example 1: Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Consider two coalitions S 1 = {1, 2, 3} and S 2 = {4, 5, 6}. Note that S 1 ∪ S 2 = N and S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅. Suppose users 1, 2, 4, 5 request file 1, which has a size of X 1 = 1 and users 3, 6 request none. Also, suppose R s,j = 1 for j ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5}, R s,j = 8 for j ∈ {3, 6}, P Rx,j (·) = P 1 T x,j (·) = 1 for all j ∈ N and P j l (·) = 1 for all j = l. Suppose R 3,1 = R 3,2 = R 6,4 = R 6,5 = 8,
In this example, we have:
We will show that v(S 1 ) + v(S 2 ) > v(N ). Note that the sums of the U ). So next we consider the energy cost components. It is easy to show that C 1 (S 1 ) + C 2 (S 1 ) + C 3 (S 1 ) is minimized when the BS sends file 1 to user 3 and user 3 multicasts it to users 1 and 2. Similarly,
On the other hand, it can be shown that the total energy cost for the coalition N = S 1 ∪S 2 is minimized when the BS sends a fraction β ∈ [0, 1] of file 1 to user 3 and a fraction 1 − β to user 6, and users 3 and 6 in turn multicast the partitions they receive to users 1, 2, 4 and 5. The resultant cost terms are as follows: C 1 (N ) = C 2 (N ) = C 4 (N ) = C 5 (N ) = 1 and C 3 (N ) + C 6 (N ) = 9 8 . Hence, the total cost term in the coalition N is C 1 (N )+C 2 (N )+C 3 (N )+C 4 (N )+C 5 (N )+ C 6 (N ) = 41 8 . Thus, the total cost term in the coalition N , which is 41 8 , is greater than the total cost term in v(S 1 )+v(S 2 ), which is 1.
Now, let (x j ) j∈N be a feasible payoff profile in the core. Then we have x(N ) = v(N ) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for every coalition S. Since S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅ and S 1 ∪ S 2 = N , we can write:
, which is a contradiction. This proves that the core is empty.
Intuitively, the core is empty in the above example due to the following reason. The set of all cellular users, N , consists of two disjoint clusters of users, S 1 and S 2 , such that the achievable data rate between user j 1 and user j 2 is low for every pair j 1 ∈ S 1 and j 2 ∈ S 2 (since R 3,4 = R 3,5 = R 6,1 = R 6,2 = 1). On the other hand, the achievable data rates among users within each cluster are high since R 3,1 = R 3,2 = R 6,4 = R 6,5 = 8. Recall that a relay multicasts data at the minimum achievable data rate between itself and any destination node within its coalition requesting the file. So when coalition S 1 (respectively, S 2 ) separates from the other users in N , data can be multicast at a high rate of 8 from relay 3 to users 1 and 2 (respectively, from relay 6 to users 4 and 5), due to which the energy consumption is low. However, when all users in the grand coalition N cooperate, data has to be multicast at a low rate of 1, due to which the energy consumption is high. Hence, the grand coalition cannot be stabilized in this example, i.e., it is not beneficial for all the users in N to cooperate.
B. Special Case
We now analyse a special case of the coalitional game under Model A, in which all D2D and BS-cellular user links are symmetric across cellular users. Specifically, we assume that: (i) all D2D communications occur at a constant rate, say R D2D , i.e., R j,l = R D2D ∀j, l ∈ N , (ii) all communications between the BS and cellular users occur at the same rate, say R s , i.e., R s,j = R s ∀j ∈ N , and (iii) the power consumption of the same type of communications is the same across all cellular users, i.e., P Rx,j (R s ) = P s , P i T x,j (R D2D ) = P T x and P k j (R D2D ) = P Rx ∀j, k ∈ N and i ∈ M. Also, we assume that R s is much smaller than R D2D ; specifically, we assume that:
For instance, such a scenario would occur in practice when all the cellular users in N are located far away from the BS but close to each other, e.g., in a stadium or concert hall, and hence data exchange between a pair of users j and l can occur at a fixed and high rate, R D2D , and BS-cellular user communication occurs at a lower data rate R s . Finally, we assume that every cellular user in N has sufficient energy available for relaying services, i.e., E j is high ∀j ∈ N . In this special case game, we will show that the core is always non-empty. A coalitional game with transferable payoffs (N , v) is convex if [14] :
It is known that the core of a coalitional game is non-empty if the game is convex [14] . We will show that the above special case coalitional game is convex, from which it will follow that the game has a non-empty core.
For a coalition S and file i ∈ M, let C i (S) be the total energy cost incurred in transferring file i from the BS to the destination nodes in S that request for file i. Note that the total energy cost incurred in transferring all files i is: C(S) = i∈M C i (S). The value of a coalition S can be written as:
The value function is separable in terms of files, i.e., v(S) is the sum of the values obtained from transferring each of the files i ∈ M. Also, recall that we have assumed that E j is large for every j ∈ N . Hence, if we show that (7) holds in the case where there is only one file in M, then from (8) it will follow that (7) holds when there are an arbitrary number of files in M. So in the rest of this section, we consider the case where there is only one file in M; also, assume without loss of generality that this file is of unit size and that a = 1. LetS ⊆ S be the set of destination nodes in coalition S that request for the file. For ease of notation, we drop the superscript i and use U j instead of U i j . So the value function can be written as:
Now, to show that (7) holds, we first show that the sums of the U j terms in v(S 1 ) + v(S 2 ) and v(S 1 ∪ S 2 ) + v(S 1 ∩ S 2 ) are equal. By (9) , the sum of the U j terms in v(
So the sums of the U j terms are equal in v(S 1 ) + v(S 2 ) and v(S 1 ∪S 2 )+v(S 1 ∩S 2 ). Hence, by (9) , to show that (7) holds, it suffices to show that:
Lemma 1: If (6) holds, then for a coalition S ⊆ N :
Proof: The result follows from the fact that if (6) holds, then whenS = ∅, the energy cost of coalition S is minimized when the file is downloaded only once from the BS to one of the users inS and it is then multicast to the other users, if any, inS over D2D links.
We now state the following theorem, which proves that in the above special case coalitional game, the core is non-empty.
Theorem 1: If (6) holds, then the above special case coalitional game has a non-empty core.
Proof: We will show that the game is convex, from which the result will follow. Recall that if (10) holds, then (7) also holds and hence the game is convex.
We now show that (10) holds in each of the following mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases.
Case 1:
Case 2:
Case 3:
Case 4:
In all these sub-cases, using Lemma 1, it can be easily checked that
Case 5:
This case can also be further divided into sub-cases: a)
Using Lemma 1, it can be easily checked that in all these sub-cases except in sub-case 5d, we have C(S 1 ) + C(S 2 ) = C(S 1 ∪S 2 )+C(S 1 ∩S 2 ) and in sub-case 5d, we have
The result follows. Theorem 1 shows that although, in general, the above coalitional game under Model A may have an empty core (see Example 1), in the special case game wherein all communication links are symmetric across the cellular users and R s is much smaller than R D2D , the core is always nonempty. Intuitively, this is because multiple clusters such as S 1 and S 2 in Example 1, such that the achievable data rate between user j 1 and user j 2 is low for every pair j 1 ∈ S 1 and j 2 ∈ S 2 and the achievable data rates among users within each cluster are high (see the last paragraph of Section III-A), cannot exist in the special case game due to the fact that the achievable data rates between different pairs of cellular users are equal; also, since R s is much smaller than R D2D , the energy required to download a file from the BS only once and multicast it over D2D links is less than that required when it is downloaded from the BS multiple times. So when all the users in N cooperate, a smaller amount of energy is required for the file transfer than when they do not cooperate. Hence, it is beneficial for all the users in the grand coalition N to cooperate.
IV. NP-COMPLETENESS OF AND HEURISTICS FOR THE
RELAY ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM UNDER MODEL B Consider Model B defined in Section II-A. Recall that in this model, to find the value, v(S), of a coalition S, we need to maximize the sum of utilities of all the cellular users in S; for this, we in turn need to solve the optimization problem P (S) defined in Section II-B (see (5) ) with the constraints α i,j ∈ {0, 1}, for all i ∈ M, j ∈ S. We refer to this problem as problem P B (S). Unfortunately, it turns out that problem P B (S) is an NP-Complete problem [12] ; we show this NPCompleteness in Section IV-A. Hence, it is computationally prohibitive to find the value, v(S), of a coalition. So we do not perform a cooperative game theoretic analysis of Model B. However, we provide heuristics to solve the total utility maximization problem in Section IV-B and evaluate their performance via numerical studies in Section V.
A. NP-Completeness
Let M S ⊆ M denote the set of all files that are requested by at least one user in S.
Theorem 2: Problem P B (S) is NP-Complete. Proof: First, it is easy to check that problem P B (S) is in class NP [12] . We now prove the NP-Completeness of problem P B (S) by reducing the generalized assignment problem (GAP) [15] , which is known to be NP-Complete, to a special case of problem P B (S).
The GAP deals with the allotment of jobs to agents. Let M S (respectively, S) be the set of all jobs (respectively, agents). Agent j ∈ S incurs a cost c i,j when it performs job i ∈ M S and agent j has a total budget of t j . When job i is assigned to agent j, a profit of p i,j is gained. The objective of the GAP is to assign an agent to each job so as to maximize the total profit from all the assignments of agents to jobs, while satisfying the budget constraint of each agent. Let α i,j be 1 if agent j is assigned to job i and 0 else. The GAP can be written as:
We now reduce the GAP to a special case of problem P B (S). We map the set of all agents (respectively, jobs) to the set of relays (respectively, files). We map the cost c i,j to the energy
T x,j ) spent by relay j when it multicasts file i. Also, we map the profit p i,j to
which is the total energy costs incurred at relay j and at the destination nodes in S that request file i when relay j multicasts file i, plus a constant 1 e > 0. Finally, we map the budget t j of agent j to the maximum amount of energy E j that may be spent by relay j (see (3)).
With the above mapping, it can be checked that a feasible solution of the GAP instance with objective function value ≥ T , for a given target T , exists iff a feasible solution of problem P B (S) with objective function value ≥ T for some target T exists. The result follows. 1 Note that the sum of the U i j terms in (5) is a constant and hence these terms can be ignored. Also, the constant e is chosen to be a large enough value so that all profits p i,j are mapped to non-negative values. Since i,j eα i,j equals e|M S |, which is a constant, a constant gets added to the objective function due to the added e terms; hence, the problem remains unchanged.
B. Heuristics
We now provide some heuristics to solve problem P B (S). 1) Greedy Algorithm: This algorithm is based on finding, for each file-user pair (i ∈ M S , j ∈ S), the total energy cost that is incurred at all the cellular users (relay and destination nodes) if file i is assigned to user j for relaying to its destination nodes; let C j,i denote this energy cost. The greedy algorithm sorts C k,i , k ∈ S for each file i in increasing order. Then, starting from the most popular file 2 , in decreasing order of file popularities, the algorithm assigns each file to the first user from its list of sorted users whose energy constraint is still met after the assignment.
2) Greedy Global Algorithm: This algorithm is similar to an algorithm proposed in [13] . In this algorithm, we calculate C j,i for all file-user pairs as in the greedy algorithm. For each file i, we construct a vector C i1,i , C i2,i , . . . , C i|S|,i where i1, . . . , i|S| ∈ S and C i1,i ≤ C i2,i ≤ . . . ≤ C i|S|,i . For each file i, we find the difference between C i2,i and C i1,i and select the file with the highest difference in the costs. Suppose fileî has the highest cost difference. We assign fileî to userî1 and remove fileî from the list of files if the energy constraint of userî1 is still met after the assignment. Otherwise, we remove the first element from the cost vector of fileî. Then we again find the file with the highest difference in costs between the second and first elements in its cost vector and repeat this process until a relay is assigned to each file.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we consider problem P B (S) with S = N , which was shown to be NP-Complete in Section IV-A. Using numerical computations, we evaluate the performances of the greedy and greedy global heuristics, which were described in Section IV-B, and that of an algorithm in which requested files are randomly assigned to relays. We consider that the probabilities with which different files are requested by users follow the Zipf's distribution; note that the Zipf's distribution has been found to closely approximate the measured file popularity frequencies in several studies, e.g., [7] . Under the Zipf's distribution, if M = {1, . . . , M } is the set of all files that may potentially be requested, the probability with which file i is requested by a user is given by p i = (
where r c is called the Zipf exponent. (Note that the set of files that are actually requested by users is a subset of M .) The relay selection problem, P B (N ), was simulated using the following model. For modelling the channel, we considered distance dependent path loss along with lognormal shadow fading. We also assumed that the channel adds additive white gaussian noise (AWGN). Table I shows the values of various simulation parameters. The total energies expended by all the cellular users of the network (relays and destination nodes) under the greedy, greedy global and random algorithms were computed for various parameter values. The total energy expended is plotted versus the number of files, M , number of users, N , and the Zipf exponent, r c , in Fig. 1 . All three plots show that the energy expended under the greedy global algorithm is lower when compared to that under the greedy algorithm, which in turn is lower than that under the random algorithm. Intuitively, the greedy global algorithm performs better than the greedy algorithm since the former algorithm takes into account not only the costs C k,i , but also the differences, C i2,i − C i1,i , during the allocation process. 
Random Allocation
Greedy Algorithm Global Greedy Algorithm Fig. 1 . Plot (a) shows the total energy expended versus number of files M . The number of files, M , is varied from 50 to 1000 while keeping the number of cellular users, N , fixed at 500 and the Zipf parameter, rc, at 0.75. Plot (b) shows the total energy expended versus the number of users N . The number of users, N , is varied from 50 to 1000 while keeping the number of files, M , fixed at 500 and the Zipf parameter, rc, fixed at 0.75. Plot (c) shows the total energy expended versus the Zipf parameter rc. The Zipf Parameter, rc, is varied from 0 to 1 while keeping the number of files, M , fixed at 1000 and the number of cellular users, N , at 500.
Also, from Fig. 1(a) , it can be seen that the total energy expended increases in the number of files for all the three algorithms; intuitively, this is because more energy is needed since more files are to be distributed. Also, all three curves saturate when the number of files becomes large; this is because the newly added files are requested with very low probabilities under the Zipf distribution. Next, from Fig. 1(b) , we see that the total energy expended increases in the number of users for all the three algorithms. Intuitively, this is because more users request files and also a file is multicast by a relay at the minimum of the achievable data rates between itself and all the destination nodes requesting the file; so as the number of destination nodes increases, data is sent at lower rates, which consumes more energy. Next, from Fig. 1(c) , it can be seen that the total energy expended decreases in the Zipf parameter r c for all the three algorithms. Intuitively, this is because as r c increases, the distribution becomes more concentrated over a few popular files; hence, only a few (popular) files are requested with high probabilities and the remaining files are requested with low probabilities.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied conditions under which users have an incentive to cooperate with each other and employ relaying using D2D communication to transfer files requested by users from the BS. We considered two different relaying models: Model A and Model B. We showed that, in general, the above coalitional game under Model A may have an empty core. However, we showed that in an important special case of this game, wherein all communications links are symmetric across cellular users and the D2D data rates are much higher than BS-cellular user data rates, the core is always non-empty. Also, we showed that under Model B, the problem of assigning relays to destination nodes so as to maximize the sum of utilities of all the users is NP-Complete. Finally, we designed heuristics to solve this problem and evaluated their performance via numerical computations. Our analysis provides insight into conditions under which it is, and is not, beneficial for all the cellular users to cooperate.
